It has occurred to me that I have yet to adequately write down my opinions of the proto-educational utopian or post-educational utopian scenarios. It seems valuable to do this to some limited extent in detail, especially in regards to the former, so as to later refer to them and see how I have changed since. However, it seems, for the most part, that I have changed very little on such opinions in my life. Doubtless coming into contact with Plato’s thoughts in my late teens, in some sense, changed my opinions on the matter, but it would be more accurate, I think, to say Plato’s thought reinforced and filtered my already pre-established opinions through certain vocabulary and symbolic paradigms. It is necessarily true that Plato made me more actively anti-democratic, and more actively pro-aristocratic, but, again, only as this pertains to the proto-educational utopia. More than anything, Plato affected my ontology, and turned me into some sort of pseudo-theist. But truly, I think, in the heart of my actions and virtue, I have always worshipped The One. Experiencing Plato merely made me self-aware of that worship, and, incidentally, more Freudian in regards to a psyche in the act and condition of its worship.
It is so difficult for me to operate in any freeing way in my seminars. The New School is the worst type of liberalism, festering in itself a blindness to truth, and not in any way the noble, idealistic blindness—that of which I myself am all too accustomed—but quite the ignoble variety, that which merely satisfies the more superficial origins of cognitive dissonance and self-satisfaction; an alienation from blame or causation to misfortune, that self-spooking that conduces weakness: a solidification of the ego against all self-aware psychic projectiles.
Liberalism is, generally speaking, more an enemy to any state of parrhesia than the most fascist of conservatism. For, at least, in the pursuit of actively disengaging a populace from any certain knowledge, the separation is not by the object’s means, but by its superiors, whereas, in liberalism, it is the subject’s self-censorship, incidentally, in its well-intentioned pursuit for total freedom in thought and “open-mindedness.”
Now, on where in some sense I disagree with the more manifest, superficial layer of Plato’s thought is its implication on human nature as being inherently tied to any sort of natural ratio in its various gamut of natures, to the extent that such a ratio is not in someway significantly partial to repetitive societal conditions. A superficial reading of Plato seems to be convinced that the ‘naturally philosophic’ nature is inevitably going to be the rarest of finds, and that virtue is not purely teachable to the extent that it can overcome a certain, common element within the human gamut of natures. This is probably because of his metaphysical belief in the afterlife and the reincarnation of a limited reserve of souls, of which, at the moment, I do not entirely coincide in thought with. The last book of Republic, in my opinion, has more potential to be misinterpreted than any of the other ten books, and it would be well advised to save its study for only the most precocious and intellectually cautious of students.
This is essentially why the ethical framework behind Plato’s aristocracy is, for me, a justified state in humanity’s progression, but not at all a finalized ethical and beatific state. It would seem that the most ethical goal would be to maximize both freedom and order within a society, in regards to a hedonistic and virtue ethics imperative, which, going along the lines of Platonic and Aristotelian thought, would only be possible in an isocratic state of nature, whereas every person is embedded with a truly self-actualized pursuit of wisdom and knowledge, and whereas all natures are of the philosophical variety, and whereas all law is maximized to the internal and minimized to the external. I am vigilant in including the qualifiers of ‘maximized’ and ‘minimized’ due to the seeming fact that any human relationship, no matter how distant, creates conflict between the participants’ objectives and desires. This is why all acts of sex are inherently rape to some degree, and why I find the majority of contemporary pop-feminist ideology deeply problematic. The condition of any psyche in any relationship, whether it is conscious of it or not, is to establish in its collective identity the most agreeable state of consent to rape and being raped—both consciously and subconsciously. All states of organizing collective relationships—even anarcho-syndicalism and true Marxist communism—involve an inherent level of oppression.
Wherever there is any form of communication, there is oppression, even within the sole individual, because we ourselves are divided psyches, and it is seemingly true that our differing desires oppress each other into submission; the majority of that battle taking place outside of our conscious, much like the majority of historical and sociological oppression goes undetected and ignored by everyone involved, even by the most conscious of it.
This is essentially why Freud thought communism inherently incongruent with human nature and a ridiculous proposition. Man can barely create peace within himself, much less within its relationship to its other. Schopenhauer recounts the same state of man with the hedgehog’s dilemma. This, to me, seems inevitable within human nature and not truly escapable. However, as is observed within the thought of thinkers like Žižek, the admission of this phenomenon’s existence does not necessitate the negation of striving towards the maximization of ethical, hedonistic, utilitarian, virtue-totality states of the collective. If anything, it would seem, it demands it, because it desires a constant state of achievement towards the societal and categorical imperative within human structures as to minimize that incongruency.
Max Stirner’s thought is worthy of mentioning here. It is seemingly true, within any emotivist or truly psychological framework, that saying all pursuits are extensions of the ego, the I, and all of its resulting constructions are but mere spooks. We surely must admit these spooks as, in an ultimate sense, nihilistic in their base and selfish in their origin, and to admit that altruism is perhaps the greatest spook of all. But it nevertheless would seem true that creating the rightly hedonistic imperative maximation of society that serves virtue ethics simultaneously (I include the latter so as to be cautious of approaching any ‘brain in a vat’ ethical dilemma) is the ultimate service of the individual, for the individual is indebted with both the life and death drive, which is pleasing to the ego in the ego’s pursuit beyond itself, truly, for itself. As long as any specter is aware of the spooks that they take part in, and self-aware of their egoism, and moreover, affirming of it, then such a condition becomes sufficient, as to avoid any false sense of altruism that plagues the thought of such a large portion of contemporary liberalist ideology.
It is rightly appropriate to establish any societal aim within certain stages and layers, so as to achieve its utility and conditions within the proper contexts, lest its most mature stage come about in any relatively immediate condition only to be either impossible in its conception or self-destructive. This is also why I struggle in any foreign seminar when influenced to participate. Do I choose to state what I think of ‘the importance of art in education’ in context to the most shortsighted of my ideologies, that is, within reference to the current paradigm of education as a material and individualistic construct? Or, if to risk the greatest amount of stark condemnation, do I answer in reference to my proto-educational utopia? Or, rather, if to risk the greatest amount of misinterpretation, do I answer in reference to my ultimate, post-educational utopia? But of course, the seminar as it is constructed within liberal ideology, especially as it manifests itself within The New School’s academic context, claims an affirmation of parrhesia if only to culturally and sociologically restrict whatever does not affirm its very occupation and base ideology. For me to speak out in any manner within reference to my proto-educational society would be not dissimilar to speaking in a foreign language with a critical tone, even though it is neither truly foreign nor truly dismissive of any participant.
Liberalism and its spooks squash any environment of open speech or exposed dialogue, because it upholds certain inherent ideologies that differ from pure truth seeking. This is why, given a specific context, Socrates is the only (relatively) free person, insofar that his only tenet is eternal doubt in context to an imperative of The Good. Within reference to the ideological binary of the contemporary United States and its hegemonic influence of other western political atmospheres, both the ‘liberal’ and the ‘conservative’ paradigms seek to surface only what is most symptomatic of any rooted problem, as to address any inherent trouble in any iconoclastic manner would be to endanger that binary itself, and thus jeopardize the hegemon. The facet that this subjugates even the most ‘radical’ of educational institutions like The New School (in some aspects it is the strongest in such atmospheres) is a very telling sight.
It seems, therefore, that in regards to establishing any hedonistic and virtue-oriented state of nature, that society must first encounter its own historical conditions intellectually, so as to rightly understand its conditions and nature. This is to say that society’s progressive distancing from its original chaotic state of nature is required in order to devolve back into it, but as this time with an orderly and isocratic state of nature, its constituents having been collectively educated as universally philosophic beings with an internalized law.
Seeing that what the current state of society seems to demonstrate, at least in effect, is more similar than dissimilar to Plato’s observing of there being a limited and inherent state of individuals who have the capable nature to be philosophic, it would best serve to establish and organize a society that adheres to being ruled by those with the philosophic nature. It also seems necessary that the rulers are also the teachers of those who are, early on, observed to have the philosophic nature themselves (as well as those without that nature when in early observance), and who will in turn become a part of the philosophic aristocracy. Indeed, once a ruler retires, it will only be the most philosophic of them that are given permission to teach and observe students, as such a duty would be considered the most honorable task as well as that requiring the most and, initially, rarest types of skills and knowledge.
It follows that such a position not be influenced in any way by material wealth or the private possession of property. All rulers and teachers must be given their commons to live and learn in, and indeed live with each other in community and kinship. The common liberal notion that ‘teachers should have higher wages’ is poisonous and ridiculous, for it further affirms the capitalistic ideology that honor should come with financial and material success. The condition of owning property and material wealth to one’s own name seems to corrupt that individual away from any rational state of consideration, the rationality by which the philosophic soul is led. It may even be better to surmise, in line with Allan Bloom’s interpretation of Plato, that the truly philosophic psyche is not so much corrupted by material wealth, and is in fact not at all noble in that regard, but rather that the truly philosophic person has no need of money when given its most bare necessities for conducting philosophic thought, the ruling of its state, and the teaching of its pupils. It is for these reasons that, like the rulers they once were, pedagogues will be given no salary, as the art of pedagoguery is that which is most noble and that which requires the most rationally-dominated psyche, and should entail the allotment of the commons along with only their most Spartan sustenance.
In the proto-educational society, then, education should be strictly classed and oriented towards each individual’s inherent nature, and to ultimately teach all within the state that their purpose is towards the collective Good of the whole rather than to the individual or towards any spook. This is, of course, all ultimately in service to the individual, but in order to achieve the conditions of such a society where each individual is free to pursue their education in service to the individual, such a society must first be laid out so that, over time, it can educate the generations towards a maximization of its ratio in regards to inherent philosophic natures. Without the correct education and culture of education, the individualistic, isocratic, egoistic post-educational society would falter, because individuals who lack the philosophic nature and who have not internalized any sense of intrinsic law will see towards their pleasures in the most shortest of sights, and thus endanger the entire collective at large that exists in order to condition the maximization of that very pursuit of the self and to minimize its jeopardization and hitherto seemingly necessary bureaucracy and the freedom-limiting condition of external law.
It follows that in the proto-educational society that, for the most part, there is almost no separation between the domestic and the institutional education. Each individual who is selected for his or her proper role by his or her nature will find it necessary that that individual’s intuitional education (that is, the educative policies set out by the philosophic aristocracy) will be universal and tangent in his or her everyday act of being. For those who are chosen to commit their natures to a craft, they will be surrounded by that practice and find that nearly every duty pressed upon them relate to that education, and so, in most accounts, will take up an education mostly suited to apprenticeship, along with whatever trivium curriculum be required in order for them to better understand and pursue that art and how his or her own duty relates to the collective achievement towards The Good.
It would also be true, especially for those with the philosophic nature and who are educated towards becoming the rulers and teachers, that the general geist of education be a very authoritarian one that stresses conformity, tradition, and obedience. The common mistake among the liberal educational thinkers is that they align such an educative culture to being one inherently opposed to critical thinking and the philosophic perspective, and, historically speaking, they are mostly correct. But authority and obedience in any institutional and educative culture inevitably trickles down from the inherent geist of that society’s rulers and from those who are given power. The geist of the vast majority of societies in history have been corrupted ones, that is, ones that were not ruled by those with a philosophic nature, but rather ruled, mostly, by those with an honor-loving nature, or, as in the case of most tyrannies or plutocracies, that of the desirive or money-loving nature. These societies were not harmonic in their structure, and by extension not harmonic with themselves, because they were not aligned to the ego-actualized but rather to the ego-seeking, either to that of honor and spooks or to that of base and primal desire.
The ego-actualized geist, when in harmony with its state, produces obedience to truth and to the order of The Good. In the final isocratic society, where all are led by their intrinsic and internalized law, the geist is dispersed throughout rather than trickled-down, so there is no need of any obedient culture of education. Obedience and conformity within the proto-educational society exists merely to create and defend order within the society where the natures are not equal in their base and distribution. Once the correct nature is ubiquitous, it becomes unnecessary to have any culture of tradition or obedience, for at that point its culture of education is conducive to its own reproduction and subsequent internalization of its law.
Whenever the appropriate age may be for those students with the philosophic nature to begin learning philosophy (Plato seems to think it roughly around 30-40; at this moment I mostly agree with him, though keeping in mind only insofar to a mostly qualitative judgment rather than one reliant on any quantitative attribute such as age), the culture of obedience will effectively become subterranean to the student’s psyche, for at this point in time the philosophic student has internalized the geist sufficiently within their superego and their ego so as to properly pursue philosophy without the risk of ego-corruption. These philosophic students will, of course, also be forced to live in a state of commons, being that, as with the graduated rulers, they cannot be corrupted in their rational nature by any material wealth or ownership that would otherwise cause their minds a weight towards the desirive side of their psyche, which would in turn fester into unbalance and disharmony with their duty to The Good. The philosophic students at this point in their studies (as all students start out, regardless of their nature in the proto-educational society) will be put into a class of education where they are mostly free to do as they please and to learn what interests them in regards to philosophy, and where, for the most part, pedagogues take a more passive role with his or her subjects in order to foster parrhesia among the students in regards to themselves, their fellow subjects, and their studies.
Speaking on the nature of early education, the only distinction here will occur between those born in each class. The child born of parents with the philosophic nature will be put into the care of other children born of such conditions, and this applies equally with those children born of parents with honor-loving natures or with desirive natures.
However, once the pedagogue observes and qualitatively confirms with others of such a position (who will be retired rulers, extensively trained in psychoanalysis and a new paradigm of psychology in order to best identify inherent natures in early childhood) that any child within a group of other children have a nature not akin to that child’s fellows, it will be transferred to the appropriate care center. This is to prevent any possible influence of the lower natures on the higher ones. Needless to say, following both the current and historic distribution of natures in civilized society, the philosophic and rational nature care centers will be the smallest in population, followed by the honor-loving ones, followed by the desirive ones. In theory, overtime, more and more children will be born with inherent natures akin to the philosophic, and less and less akin to the desirive, due to the active educative and harmonic culture of the state, and also to the passive eugenics that would naturally occur.
It will also be required, as far as I can see at the moment, that sexual culture and reproduction will need to be severely monitored and limited. Seeing that each nature will, for the most part, exclusively mingle with those individuals of their own nature, there shouldn’t be much risk involved in making sure each nature breed with its own.
However, successful conception will only be permitted in specific and reasonably distant timeframes, so that each generation is easier to analyze and monitor its progress. I also agree with Plato that the structure and culture of the family is problematic to the means of securing order within The Good. It seems that the familial culture instills obedience and honor to individuals who are not necessarily worthy of such gifts. The familial culture seems to have an enormously profound influence of the subject’s superego and nature, and if the goal of the proto-educational society is to eventually lead all natures to being that of the philosophic one, then it follows that each subject be influenced by the care of the philosophic nature.
It is for this reason that the family structure, in its educative extent, will have to be eliminated. Newborn infants will be taken away and put into the care of trained psychoanalysts who, in addition to being apt to identify or suspect inherent natures, will also be trained in how to administrator and control whatever environment is most conducive to fixating the child’s nature to that of the philosophic one. When the pedagogues deem an infant ready, the infant will be moved from the nursery to the earliest stage of directive education, where, along with others, he or she intermixes with his or her companions, and is given the opportunity to interact with a variety of objects—both artistic and practical in function—in which to direct his or her telltale, neophyte libido, so as to create an environment that allows the pedagogues to best determine the nature of each individual.
Once a pedagogue has qualitatively affirmed a nature, he or she will join in a dialogue with other pedagogues in that care center to agree upon that nature, and subject whatever theory of the child’s nature to its utmost scrutiny. If one is not decided upon, but suspicions lean towards a nature of the individual differing from its care center, the child will be given over to the appropriate care center until the process is duly repeated.
It of course follows that, once such a state has been sufficiently established and culturally embedded, that all considerations and estimations be up to criticism and debate, and finalized by the philosophic rulers, so as to continually adapt to the increasingly dominant philosophic and rational natures of the rulers and post-ruler pedagogues, whose judgment and prudence will seemingly inevitably be superior to that of anyone in their current state, and especially to the initial author.